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This paper explores the implications for labor market outcomes
of systematic testing of applicants in the hiring process. A matching
model in which productivity is a worker’s private information is used.
Both wages and hiring rates are endogenous. A minority is deﬁned
as a group for whom the test is less precise in identifying individual
productivity. Welfare and employment outcomes across various hiring
policies are compared. Simulations suggest that tests are typically too
accurate so that in a laissez faire economy minority group members
fair better than the majority group members. Rules requiring equity
in hiring reverse this result.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper looks at the implications of ﬁrm level hiring policy for the labor
market when aptitude tests form part of the hiring decision. The analysis
1is used to assess the role of cultural bias in the test for the labor market
outcomes of ethnic minorities.
The baseline model studied here is a variant of the search and matching
approach of Pissarides [2000] with a single ethnic group. Individuals are ei-
ther qualiﬁed (i.e. productive) or unqualiﬁed (unproductive). Qualiﬁcation
is private information to the worker so that ﬁrms prefer to use an imprecise
test of worker ability over no test at all. Firms set a threshold value of the
test score and hire those workers that achieve above the threshold. For a
given proportion of qualiﬁed workers in the unemployment pool, greater test
precision improves the rate at which ﬁrms identify qualiﬁed workers. This
causes the average quality of the unemployment pool to fall. The eventual
consequence of universal adoption of all but the least accurate tests is that,
over time, everyone is made worse oﬀ.
Autor and Scarborough [2004] argue that formal testing is suﬃciently
widespread to justify a study of its eﬀect. At least 30% of ﬁrms are reported
to use some form of aptitude test as part of the hiring process. They study
a data set obtained from a large US retail company and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
increase in the eﬀectiveness of hiring since the adoption of a computerized
test. They also ﬁnd that fears of increased ethnic inequity stemming from
formal testing are unfounded, largely because ﬁrms are already using some
form of statistical discrimination. Given their results and the current ubiq-
uity of computers, testing ought to be even more common. One source of
concern that they abstract from, however, is that the tests may be less able
to determine the ability of workers from certain ethnic or cultural groups.
This gives rise to the fear of systematic discrimination in the hiring process
(or at least fear of litigation that asserts the same).
To assess the basis for such fears, I extend the baseline model to in-
corporate diﬀerent ethnic groups. An ethnic minority is deﬁned as visually
identiﬁable group for whom the employment test is less precise. As long as
ﬁrms are permitted to recognize the bias in the test and set diﬀerent thresh-
olds for diﬀerent ethnic groups, the minority group members are typically
better oﬀ than their majority group counterparts. If fear of litigation causes
the ﬁrms to impose the same threshold and wage proﬁle on ethnic minorities
2as they use to hire majority group workers the welfare results are reversed.
This remains true if color-blind testing is used (i.e. when the employment
decision is made ignorant of the applicant’s ethnicity).
The implication is that concerns about cultural bias in the test (as long
as it is recognized) may be misplaced. A greater cause for concern is the use
of testing per se. Consistent with the results of Autor and Scarborough, in-
dividual ﬁr m sa l w a y sb e n e ﬁt from the use of a more accurate tests than their
competitors use. Also, qualiﬁed workers initially beneﬁt from the universal
adoption of a more accurate test. But, in the long-run the success rate of the
hiring process in identifying qualiﬁed workers is necessarily equal to their
inﬂow proportions. The greater test accuracy simply serves to slowdown the
matching rate for everyone leading to higher levels of unemployment.
Of course, being able to draw such conclusions requires analysis of a
speciﬁc modeling environment and in doing so the generality of the results
comes into question. One assumption made here for the purpose of tractabil-
ity is that a worker’s duration of unemployment is private information. This
assumption restricts the direct applicability of the model to people with a
low attachment to the labor market, young people, homemakers etc.; the
kind of market studied by Autor and Scarborough [2004]. The more usual
assumption is that workers can always provide evidence of how long they
have been unemployed. But this is not true of everyone in any market.
Furthermore, even when unemployment spell length is known, how hard an
individual has been seeking work is not. Both assumptions represent po-
lar cases. In any event, I will argue that making the worker’s duration of
unemployment common knowledge at worst dilutes my results rather than
reverses them.
Analysis of a model of hiring with signal extraction is provided by Phelps
[1972]. Aigner and Cain [1977] extend his model to allow for the error in
the signal of productivity to be more dispersed for minority workers. In
their basic model, the hiring decision is completely exogenous. Workers are
simply paid their expected marginal productivity. As all workers get hired,
the average wage does not diﬀer across ethnic groups (wage dispersion does).
They conclude that there is no economic discrimination. In an extension,
3they point out that if ﬁrms required workers’ expected productivity to exceed
some lower bound as a requirement of employment, discriminatory outcomes
could emerge. Their analysis says nothing about how the lower bound is
determined nor do they discuss its eﬀect on unemployment.
Cornell and Welch [1996] provide a market based model similar in struc-
ture to that studied by Burdett et al [2001] (except that wages are exoge-
nous). Society consists of two ethnic groups. Individuals making hiring
decisions have less dispersed signals as to the productivity of an individ-
ual from their own group. This approach essentially endogenizes the lower
bound on expected productivity suggested by Aigner and Cain [1977] and
leads to the discriminatory hiring practices that they had predicted. Cor-
nell and Welch [1996] go on to look at persistence of discrimination in this
environment. They allow the last generation’s hires be the next generations
recruiters and start from a position where one group has complete control
over hiring. They ﬁnd that selective hiring leads to less favorable distribu-
tion of productivities among the unemployed for the ascendant group which
leads in the long-run to the elimination of discrimination. While the pa-
per provides a compelling narrative of the evolution of discrimination the
current paper suggests that making wages exogenous is not an innocuous
assumption. The initial preparedness of the minority group to accept lower
wages would lead to diﬀerential hiring thresholds and faster integration than
they ﬁnd.
Another paper that uses signal extraction in a market context is Sat-
tinger [1998]. In his paper the uncertainty is over an individual’s quit rate.
He supposes that for unmodelled reasons minority group members might
have a higher expected quit rate than the majority group members. He
examines how hiring practices will diﬀer in this situation. Firms practice
statistical discrimination and hire people from the faster quitting group more
slowly. He argues that this kind of discrimination is economic because ﬁrms
are inﬂuenced by the group’s quitting rate in making their assessment about
an individual’s propensity to quit. Again his paper uses exogenous wages.
The reason both Sattinger [1998] and Cornell and Welch [1996] impose
exogenous wages in their models is that with private information, wage for-
4mation is hard to address. In both of their models an inter-ﬁrm wage-posting
game (as in Masters [1999]) would lead to a wage of zero; a consequence of
the Diamond Paradox (Diamond [1971]). Bargaining is possible and plausi-
ble in a positive sense but opens a can of worms from a modeling perspective.
One model of discrimination that does have bargained wages is Mailath et al
[2000]. In their model, however, there is no private information. Discrimina-
tory outcomes emerge when ﬁrms coordinate their recruitment eﬀorts toward
one ethnic group over another. This is justiﬁed because this favoritism leads
the favored group to acquire skills more readily than the disfavored group.
The paper presented here is the ﬁr s tt oe m b e db a r g a i n i n gi n t oam a r -
ket context with signal extraction. I use the single round bargaining game
of Mailath et al [2000]: Nature picks either party with equal probability
to make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. Given private information on worker
productivity (and duration of unemployment), there are a large number of
outcomes that can be supported as equilibria. The outcome used here is
the natural counterpart to the solution that emerges in the full information
world: either party always asks for the whole (expected) match surplus.
In another departure from the signal extraction literature, I do not use
normally distributed errors. Instead I use the approach of Coate and Loury
[1993] in their model of endogenous statistical discrimination. The use of
normally distributed errors has the beneﬁt of being able to associate test
accuracy with error variance. But, it is hard to reconcile this with the often
reported lower average performance of minorities on standardized tests. In
my model people are either qualiﬁed or not with productivities 1 and 0 re-
spectively. The test gives a score between 0 and 1, uniformly distributed for
unqualiﬁed workers, distributed with an upward sloping density for qualiﬁed
workers. Test accuracy is synonymous with ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance
of the distribution of test scores for the qualiﬁed workers. When a test is
more accurate for one group it therefore means that qualiﬁed workers in that
group are more likely to be identiﬁed as such. This means that changes in
t h et e s tt h a tﬁt with the concept of accuracy can also change the mean of
the test scores.
Evidence on the relationship between standardized tests scores and pro-
5ductivity is provided in Hartigan and Wigdor [1989]. They provide a meta-
analysis of previous studies and ﬁnd that the slope of the regression of pro-
ductivity measure on test scores is typically steeper for nonminorities than
it is for blacks. They also conﬁrm an earlier result of Wigdor and Garner
[1982] that equations estimated on pooled data tend to overestimate the
productivity of black workers. The data they use is largely based on testing
current workers and productivity is taken from supervisors’ reports. In my
model, at least in steady state, the composition of the employed workforce
is identical to that of the labor market entrants. Testing current, employed
workers is the same as taking a random sample from new entrants. By
construction, therefore, my model reproduces Hartigan and Wigdor’s ﬁrst
result. As productive majority group members in the model are more likely
t og e th i g ht e s ts c o r e st h a np r o d u c t i v em i n o r i t yg r o u pm e m b e r s ,a th i g h
test scores the majority worker’s probability model will over predict minor-
ity worker productivity. At low test scores the opposite is true. By virtue
of the way probability densities necessarily integrate to one, these eﬀects
cancel out. Indeed, that my model does not reproduce Hartigan and Wig-
dor’s second result demonstrates the sense in which my model focuses on
test accuracy.1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out
the baseline model of worker testing with a single ethnic group and derives
analytical results in some detail. This is because many of the results are
directly relevant for the extended model of Section 3 in which ethnic diversity
is introduced. Section 3 also contains an analysis of various wage policies.
Section 4 provides a general discussion of the issues raised in Sections 2 and
3 and illustrates with some numerical examples. Section 5 Concludes.
1Of course, their use of linear regression analysis on data generated from my model
would be miss-speciﬁed. The actual results could generate over or under prediction of
minority productivity.
62 The Baseline (single ethnic group) Model
2.1 Environment
Time passes continuously with an inﬁnite horizon. The economy comprises
of a large number (formally a continuum) of unemployed workers and a large
number of unﬁlled jobs. The mass of unemployed workers is normalized
to 1. The mass of vacancies is v (controlled by a free-entry condition).
Participants on both sides of the market have (potentially) inﬁnite lives, are
risk neutral and discount the future at rate r.
Workers are either born qualiﬁed or unqualiﬁed for employment in the
homogeneous jobs. A qualiﬁed worker produces 1 unit of output per period.
The output from an unqualiﬁed worker is zero. Qualiﬁcation is private infor-
mation to the worker. Although the distribution of unemployment durations
is common knowledge, an individual worker’s duration of unemployment is
also his private information. This last assumption is important for simpli-
fying the analysis. Its role in driving the results is reviewed at the end of
the paper.
Workers seek employment but do not know where the ﬁrms are. I assume
that unemployed workers encounter vacancies at a Poisson arrival rate α.
T h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fw o r k e r st ov a c a n c i e si st h e nα/v. The implied meeting
function is non-standard in the search and matching literature (Petrongolo
and Pissarides [2001]). This was a deliberate choice. The focus of this
paper is on the role of testing for individual productivity. Any ineﬃciencies
that emerge in equilibrium should be attributable to the role of private
information and the institutions set up to overcome it - not to externalities
arising from the matching function.2 This formulation also assists with
the extension of the model incorporating diﬀerent ethnic groups. As both
groups will be in the same labor market, random matching will imply that
both groups should have the same meeting rate. Comparing outcomes for
2In this arrangement, ﬁrms do face a congestion externality; they do not take account
of the reduction in matching rate experienced by other vacancies when creating jobs of
their own. However, as the workers’ matching rate is exogenous, there is no spillover eﬀect
onto workers who are the primary concern of this study.
7the diﬀerent groups will amount to comparative statics in this baseline single
ethnic group model.
It is assumed that when a worker and ﬁrm choose to match, it is forever.
Thus, matched pairs eﬀectively leave the market. To make the environment
stationary, every worker hired is replaced by a new entrant. A proportion η
of new entrants are qualiﬁed. The implied proportion of the unemployment
pool that is qualiﬁed, µ, is therefore endogenous.3 Unemployed workers
receive no income. On the other hand, a vacancy costs a per unit time to
keep open.
Following Coate and Loury [1993], when a ﬁrm and worker meet, the ﬁrm
will test (or interview) the worker which generates a noisy signal θ ∈ [0,1]
as to her ability. If the worker is qualiﬁed, the probability distribution
function over θ is F(θ). The associated density function f(.) is assumed
to be continuously diﬀerentiable and increasing on [0,1] with f(1) < ∞. If
the worker is unqualiﬁed the distribution of signals is normailized to being
uniform on [0,1].4 Given a worker’s type, the signals are independent draws
from the appropriate distribution. The outcome of the test is assumed to
be observable to the worker and, if necessary, veriﬁable in a court of law.
The test results remains the property of the ﬁrm and it is assumed that test
results are not shared with other ﬁrms.5
As f0 > 0, the distribution of signals for qualiﬁed workers ﬁrst-order
stochastically dominates the distribution of signals for unqualiﬁed workers
(i.e. F(θ) <θ ). The restriction on the upper endpoint of f means that
even if someone gets the maximum grade on the test, there is still a positive
chance that he is unqualiﬁed.
From Bayes’ rule, the expected productivity of a worker given signal θ
3An alternative here would be the “cloning" assumption, that individuals are replaced
by someone the same as themselves. In my notation, this would make µ exogenous and η
endogenous.
4To see why this is a normalization, suppose instead that the signal generated from
testing unqualiﬁed candidates was distributed G. Then we can use G(θ) as the signal and
simply call the distribution of G(θ) among the qualiﬁed candidates F.
5It is typically illegal for ﬁrms to share information about applicants.





This forms the basis for the wage negotiation. Straightforward diﬀerentia-
tion shows that π is increasing in both arguments.
2.2 Bargaining
Following Mailath et al [2000], I assume that wages are determined by a
single round of strategic bargaining. Once a worker has met a ﬁrm with
a vacancy, the worker takes the test and nature chooses either party to
make a take-it-or-leave-it wage oﬀer. If the oﬀer is accepted the contract is
struck and, as described earlier, both parties leave the market. The presence
of private information complicates the formal analysis (see Appendix) of
this bargaining game beyond that of Mailath et al [2000]. The solution
that emerges is still quite simple. Whoever makes the oﬀer will get all




− Vq − Vf
where Vf is the continuation value of a vacancy.6 Essentially, it will never
be in the interest of a ﬁrm to oﬀer the worker a wage less than rVq.W a g e
formation therefore has the ﬂavor of eﬃciency wages (as in Weiss [1980]).
Firms try to impute the productivity of workers from the wage they will
accept.
2.3 Search
As free-entry drives the value of Vf to zero, a qualiﬁed worker and a ﬁrm will
match if the realized value of θ means that π(θ,µ) ≥ rVq. As π is increasing
in θ and any worker and ﬁrm who meet each other take Vq and µ as given,
there exists a unique (threshold) signal, θ∗, such that π(θ∗,µ)=rVq. If the
6The continuation value for unqualiﬁed workers is Vu.
9realized value of θ exceeds θ∗ the worker is hired. As the wage, w, divides
























































∗ (π(θ,µ) − π(θ∗,µ))dF(θ)
The preceding analysis has assumed that unqualiﬁed people will accept
any job acceptable to qualiﬁed people (i.e. Vq ≥ Vu). Showing that this is
always true is left as an exercise for the reader.
2.4 Steady-state
As 1−F(θ∗) > 1−θ∗ qualiﬁed people are hired more frequently than unquali-
ﬁed people. The proportion of qualiﬁed people, µ, in the unemployment pool
is obtained from the steady-state population ﬂow equations. For qualiﬁed
workers,
δη = α[1 − F(θ∗)]µ (3)
where δ is the (endogenous) steady-state birth rate. Equation (3) therefore
equates the inﬂow of qualiﬁed people to the rate at which they acquire jobs.
Similarly for unqualiﬁed people,
δ(1 − η)=α[1 − θ∗](1− µ)











10Clearly, µ<η ;t h eq u a l i ﬁcation rate is lower in the steady-state market
population than it is among the new entrants.
2.5 Vacancies
Free-entry (with zero set-up cost) means that the asset value of vacancies,
Vf is driven to zero. The present discounted ﬂow beneﬁt to holding open a
vacancy has to equal to the cost, a of keeping it open.
Half of the qualiﬁed workers a ﬁrm could meet will extract the whole
of the expected match surplus. The expected proﬁtf r o mam a t c hw i t ha
qualiﬁed worker is therefore [1 − π(θ∗,µ)]/2 which occurs with probability
µ[1 − F(θ∗)]. Similarly, the expected proﬁt from matching with an unqual-
iﬁed worker is −π(θ∗,µ)/2 which happens with probability (1 − µ)[1− θ∗].
As ﬁrms meet workers at the rate α/v. We have
α
2rv
{µ[1 − π(θ∗,µ)][1 − F(θ∗)] − (1 − µ)π(θ∗,µ)[1− θ∗]} = a (4)
Note that the contents of the curly brackets are the ex ante (i.e. pre-test)
match surplus.
2.6 Equilibrium
Deﬁnition 1 A Market Equilibrium is a list {θ∗,µ,v}t h a ts a t i s ﬁes:
free-entry, Vf =0:























11The system is block recursive. It should be clear that given θ∗ and µ,
as long as RHS of (5) is positive (veriﬁed below), the implied value of v is
unique. Equations (6) and (7) jointly determine θ∗ and µ.7 In the sequel
equilibria will be referred to simply as a pair, (θ∗,µ).
Figure 1 depicts the determination of equilibrium in (θ,µ) space. The
diagram is restricted to values of µ less than η. The curve labeled SS rep-
resents the schedule of values for which θ and µ are consistent with steady
state. It should be clear that the curve passes through the points (0,η) and
(1, ˆ µ) where
ˆ µ =
η
(1 − η)f(1) + η
Moreover, the SS curve is downward sloping over the whole region.8 This
is because a higher test score threshold means that a higher proportion of
the workers who pass are qualiﬁed. This reduces the average quality of the
unemployment pool.9
The curve labeled EM represents eﬃcient matching (equation (6)). The
Appendix establishes that the implied reaction function, θ∗(µ) is downward
sloping, that θ∗(η) ≥ 0 and θ∗(0) < 1. As the quality of the unemployment
pool worsens, matching becomes more stringent. Existence of equilibrium
is then a consequence of the intermediate value theorem.
Multiplicity of steady-states has not in general been ruled out. However,
as η does not enter equation (6), monotonicity of θ∗(µ) implies that for η
small enough there must be a unique crossing. In any case, the concern here
is with the dynamically stable steady-states which will have qualitatively
7If the level of vacancy creation were to aﬀect the matching rate of workers (as occurs
with more usual matching arrangements), this recursiveness disappears.
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Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium in baseline model
13similar comparative statics. No example of multiple steady-state has been
found.
Whenever f(0) is suﬃciently close to 1, an equilibrium with θ∗ =0and
µ = η is possible. This happens whenever π(0,η), is high enough to warrant
match formation. To explore this possibility further we need to analyze
what happens when there is no testing.
2.7 No-test world
When ﬁrms have no means of distinguishing workers, every meeting leads to
am a t c h .L e tV represent the value to being a worker and w the expected



















A n yt e s ts u c ht h a tπ(0,η) <r V will have no eﬀect. From the deﬁnition
of π(.,.) and the solution for rV, this means that a viable test requires
f(0) <
α(1 − η)
2r + α(1 − η)
(9)
By restricting attention to viable tests, we rule out the (0,η) equilibrium.
2.8 Changes in F
Here we consider a change in the accuracy of the test. Attention is restricted
to variations in F that satisfy the monotone likelihood property (MLP).
That is, test 2 is deemed more accurate than test 1 if the likelihood ratio,
f2(θ)/f1(θ), is increasing in θ. This implies that F2 ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates F1 which means that for any given pass threshold, the probability
that a qualiﬁed worker passes test 1 is lower than the probability that a
qualiﬁed worker passes test 2.
14It should be clear from equation (7) that moving to a more accurate test
decreases steady-state µ for every given value of θ∗ —t h eSS curve shifts
down. Essentially as the test works better, ﬁrms are more able to distinguish
the qualiﬁed workers leaving less of them among the unemployed. Equation
(6) implies that for any given value of µ, an increase in test accuracy makes
matching more selective, θ∗ increases and the EM curve shifts to the right
(see Appendix). These shifts are demonstrated in Figure 2 (for a unique
steady-state). The solid lines represent the EM and SS curves prior to the
change in F. The dashed lines represent the EM and SS curves after the
change in F. The combined eﬀect of the increased accuracy of the test
(Point 1 to Point 2) leads to a fall in µ and increase in θ∗.
In terms of the outcomes for individuals in the model, π(θ∗,µ), the prob-
ability that the marginal individual is qualiﬁed, is more important than θ∗
or µ taken individually. This is because Vq = π(θ∗,µ)/r and the average
wage, ¯ w =( π(θ∗,µ)+η)/2. The latter equality comes from the fact that in
steady-state, the proportion of productive individuals among those who get
hired must equal η.
In Figure 2, point X represents the immediate impact of the universal
adoption of the more accurate test (i.e. what happens when µ is held con-
stant). It is shown in the Appendix that such a move necessarily makes
qualiﬁed workers better oﬀ; π(θ∗,µ) increases. This is because qualiﬁed
workers’ expected posterior probability of being shown to be qualiﬁed in-
creases.
At Point X,h o w e v e r ,a sq u a l i ﬁed workers would be getting jobs faster
than they enter the market, µ has to fall. It is also shown in the Appendix
that the implied South Easterly movements along the EM curve (from point
X t op o i n t2 )m a k ea l lw o r k e r sw o r s eo ﬀ; π(θ∗,µ) falls. This is because the
implied reduction in the matching rate from the worsening prior out-weighs
the beneﬁts from increased selectivity even for the qualiﬁed workers. So, in
general, the overall impact of increased accuracy has an ambiguous eﬀect
on π(θ∗,µ). More simply put, more accurate testing is initially good for
qualiﬁed workers but the ensuing dilution of the unemployment pool can







Figure 2: Changes in F
16ambiguity of the eﬀect of changes in test accuracy on π(θ∗,µ) will be revisited
in the simulations.
2.9 Other comparative statics
An increase in α (or a decrease in r) shifts the EM curve to the right at
every value of µ. Matching becomes more selective (θ∗ rises) which lowers
the steady-state proportion of qualiﬁed workers (µ falls). An increase in
η shifts the SS curve upwards for every value of θ∗. With more qualiﬁed
workers around, matching becomes less selective which leads to a further
increase in µ.
2.10 Eﬃciency
While the well-being of qualiﬁed workers can improve with the accuracy of
tests (see simulation section for further discussion), the lot of the unqualiﬁed
workers will only get worse as tests get more accurate. This is essentially be-
cause θ∗ increases with accuracy.10 Here we consider the issue as to whether
there is a best test.
Risk-neutrality means that Utilitarian Welfare is simply output minus
costs. When there is no testing, output is αη.11 In a world with testing,
output is α(1 − F(θ∗)µ. As η ≥ µ, output is always higher in the no-test
world. A remaining issue is what happens to costs. The only source of cost
in the model is the advertising cost, va, paid by the ﬁrms. Under free-entry,
the proﬁts of ﬁrms just cover those costs so that welfare equals the ﬂow
output that goes to workers. Whenever
(r + α)η
2r + α
>µ (1 − F(θ∗)),
10The wage proﬁle changes too but increased accuracy tends to work against the un-
qualiﬁed here as well. This is because the MLP means the expected test score, contingent
on passing is higher for productive workers. The average wage ¯ w =( π(θ
∗,µ)+η)/2 only
increases if the wage proﬁle shifts suﬃciently in favour of the qualiﬁed workers.
11More precisely, the description of the environment means that αη i st h ei n c r e a s ei n
output per unit time. As the individuals who are already matched have eﬀectively left the
market, this increase in output is all that matters.
17total output under a test is less than that which accrues to workers in the
absence of a test - testing reduces utilitarian welfare. As θ∗ increases with α,
for any F(.) the condition will be true for α/r large enough. It is possible to
construct tests that generate a level of welfare higher than from no-testing
but they necessarily need to be such that µ is close to η and θ∗ is close to 0.
It is also possible to show that in any steady-state equilibrium
π(θ∗,µ) <
αη(1 − F(θ∗))
2rη + α(1 − F(θ∗))
Comparison with (8) implies that whenever (1 − F(θ∗)) <η ,everyone is
worse oﬀ under testing than under the absence of testing. In the simulations
that follow, it will be shown that steady-states in which everyone is worse
oﬀ under testing are easy to construct even when this condition does not
apply. Also, for the class of tests used, whenever testing is a bad idea,
further increases in test accuracy make everyone even worse oﬀ.
Of course, this analysis ignores transitions and we know that qualiﬁed
workers are better oﬀ immediately after the introduction of the new test.
However, as long as α is large relative to r, the transition is relatively short
and steady-state welfare strongly inﬂuences the value of introducing the new
test. In any case, when we come to compare outcomes for diﬀerent ethnic
groups in the same market we re-interpret the diﬀerence in accuracy across
tests as the diﬀerence in accuracy for the same test across diﬀerent groups.
There, transitions will not be an issue.
2.11 Firm adoption of tests
To reduce the complexity of the preceding analysis we have so far imposed
the test on the environment. Yet, a positive analysis should ask whether
the adoption of any viable test is in a ﬁrm’s private interest. There are 2
questions here. First, will ﬁrms adopt any viable test over no-test? Second,
given some test is in common usage would a ﬁrm necessarily prefer to use a
more accurate test than the other ﬁrms?12
12It may appear that the ﬁrst question is a special case of the second as no-test might
be viewed as a very low accuracy test. But this need not be true, for instance the class of
18To answer the ﬁrst question recall that, by deﬁn i t i o n ,i faﬁrm applies a
viable test when no other ﬁrm is using any test, there exists some strictly
positive threshold, θt, of the test score below which matches will not form.
Also, ﬁrms receive half of the expected pre-test match surplus which, when
no other ﬁrm is testing, can be written as
St ≡ η[1 − π(θt,η)][1 − F(θt)] − (1 − η)π(θt,η)[1− θt]
where θt solves π(θt,η)=rV (as deﬁn e di n( 8 ) ) .A sf(.) is upward sloping,
θtf(θt) >F (θt). Substitution shows that St >η− rV, the match surplus
without the test. This sheds light on the eﬃciency of testing considered
above. Compared with the no-test world, a ﬁrm will use any viable test
because it increases the expected match surplus. However, in the long run,
as other ﬁrms adopt the test, they can only be better oﬀ than before the
test was ﬁrst introduced if the adjustment to steady-state has a small eﬀect
on the rate at which they hire qualiﬁed workers. This will happen only if
the test is suﬃciently imprecise.
To see why ﬁrms always prefer more accurate tests consider what hap-
pens if a ﬁrm unilaterally adopts test Fn such that Fn <Ffor all θ. The
implied expected surplus under the same threshold, θ∗, would be
Sn ≡ µ[1 − rVq][1− Fn(θ∗)] − (1 − µ)rVq [1 − θ∗]
>µ [1 − rVq][1− F(θ∗)] − (1 − µ)rVq [1 − θ∗]
Of course, imposing a threshold equal to θ∗ would either cause this ﬁrm
to form some matches with negative expected (post-test) surplus or prevent
some matches with positive (post-test) surplus from forming. The pair-
wise eﬃcient value of the threshold, θn, is such that under the new test,
πn(θn,µ)=rVq.13 Using θn can only further increase the expected (pre-
test) surplus.
densities used to characterize the test in the simulations is θ
n,n>0 on [0,1]. These do




19As ﬁrms do not take account of the impact of their adoption choice on
other market participants, ﬁrms will always adopt the most accurate test
even when it is not in their collective long-term interest to do so.
3 Ethnic Minorities
Here we extend the model to incorporate individuals in the economy for
whom the hiring process works less well. These individuals will be desig-
nated (ethnic) minorities. Speciﬁcally, it will be assumed that minorities
are identiﬁable by appearance and the employment test is less accurate for
them. This is meant to reﬂect the extent of cultural bias in the test. If
t h et e s ti sd e s i g n e dt ob e s ti d e n t i f yp roductive individuals in the majority
group, questions will be written in a way that individuals raised in a diﬀerent
culture may ﬁnd ambiguous
Notationally, the subscript A will be used for workers who are members
of the majority group and subscript I will be used for the minority workers.
The proportion of minority individuals among the inﬂow to the labor market
is φ. The endogenous steady-state proportion of the pool of unemployed
workers that are minority group members is ψ. As above, the proportion of
qualiﬁed workers in each group is η. Following from the preceding analysis,
for both groups, the distribution of the test scores for unqualiﬁed workers
is assumed to be uniform.14 The diﬀerence in Fj,j= A,I, the distribution
of scores for qualiﬁed workers, is such that the test is more accurate (in the
sense of MLP) for the majority group members.
We look at how diﬀerential test-score performance interacts with diﬀer-
ent policy positions with respect to the treatment of minorities in the hiring
process.
Diﬀerent treatment is laissez faire in the extended model: ﬁrms and workers
are free to arrive at their pair-wise eﬃcient hiring threshold and wage
proﬁle.
14This restriction is not made without loss of generality. It essentially states that the
test is equally uninformative about the productivity of unqualiﬁed workers of either ethnic
group.
20Equal treatment dictates that minorities should be hired as if they were
majority group members. That is, the pair-wise eﬃcient test thresh-
old and wage proﬁles that emerge from the hiring of majority group
members are imposed in the hiring decision with respect to minorities.
Color blind hiring means that the matching and wage oﬀer decisions have
to be made before the ﬁrm knows the ethnicity of the worker.
Random matching means that in this extended environment the rate at
which workers of both ethnic groups meet ﬁrms will be the same. Even if
I had assumed a more standard meeting technology, α would be the same
for both groups. This section will also assume that α is exogenous.This
helps to focus the analysis on equity across ethnic groups under each policy
regime. This approach, however, does abstract from how the eﬀect of the
diﬀerent policy regimes on vacancy creation might impact the meeting rate
of workers and ﬁrms.
3.1 Diﬀerent treatment (DT)
Here, comparison of outcomes across ethnic groups within the same market
therefore amounts to comparative statics with respect to F(.) in the baseline
model. An equilibrium of the extended model will be a list {θ∗
A,µ A,θ∗
I,µ I,ψ,v}
such that the market for labor is in steady-state, and subject to eﬃcient
matching and free-entry of vacancies.
The steady-state equations are therefore:
δη(1 − φ)=α(1 − ψ)[1 − FA(θ∗
A)]µA
δ(1 − η)(1 − φ)=α(1 − ψ)[1 − θ∗
A](1 − µA)
δηφ = αψ[1 − FI(θ∗
I)]µI















for J = A,I.



















As general uniqueness has not been shown there is an implicit assumption
that both ethnic groups are in the same equilibrium. While it may not be
obvious from (10), ψ<φ .This is because steady-state requires that people
get jobs in the same proportions at which they enter the market. As θ∗
A >
θ∗
I unqualiﬁed majority workers get jobs more slowly than do unqualiﬁed
minority workers. As discussed above this means the matching rates for
qualiﬁed workers also shows a similar pattern and consequently in steady-
state there will be relatively more majority workers in the unemployment
pool.













Further analysis and discussion is left to the simulations section.
3.2 Equal treatment (ET)
The majority threshold for matching and the wage as a function of the test
score is imposed on the minority.15 A tilde (~) over variable symbols is used
to represent those variables that will change under this policy prescription.
The steady-state equations are therefore:
15Equilibrium here is entirely speciﬁed by what happens in the market for majority
workers. Indeed, it might appear that knowing they have to hire minority workers at
the same rate and with the same wages as majority workers, ﬁrms would have a diﬀerent
optimal hiring strategy than that implied by the single ethnic group model. This not true.
Firms will produce less vacancies but, because the matching rate by workers in unaﬀected
b yt h ep r e s e n c eo fd i ﬀerent ethnic groups, eﬃcient matching for majority group members
is unaﬀe c t e db yt h i sh i r i n gp o l i c y .
22δη(1 − φ)=α(1 − ˜ ψ)[1 − FA(θ∗
A)]µA
δ(1 − η)(1 − φ)=α(1 − ˜ ψ)[1 − θ∗
A](1 − µA)
δηφ = αψ[1 − FI(θ∗
A)]˜ µI
δ(1 − η)φ = αψ[1 − θ∗














for J = A,I.
and ˜ ψ is obtained from
Ã
˜ ψ








1 − ˜ µI
¶
As FA(θ) <F I(θ) for all θ, µA < ˜ µI and so ˜ ψ>φ .Equal treatment
necessarily leads to more unemployment among the minority group.
3.3 Color-blind hiring (CB)
The Boston Philharmonic Orchestra, now famously, conducts auditions be-
hind a screen to avoid the candidate’s appearance inﬂuencing the result. In
the context of this paper, this will amount to the ethnicity of the worker
being private information. Hiring will necessarily be consistent with equal
treatment. The diﬀerence from the previous arrangement is that absent
information as to the ethnic group of the worker, the prior reﬂects the pro-
portion of productive individuals in the whole market rather than simply
that of the majority group. Also, the posterior probabilities of being pro-
ductive will be calculated based on the appropriately combined distribution
of test scores.
For what follows we will use the carat (^) to signify variables that have
the same meaning as above but are potentially diﬀerent under color-blind
hiring. The analysis follows that of the original model so that given a test
score of θ the posterior probability that the worker is productive is
ˆ π(θ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µA, ˆ µA)=
(1 − ˆ ψ)ˆ µAfA(θ)+ˆ ψˆ µIfI(θ)
(1 − ˆ ψ)ˆ µAfA(θ)+( 1− ˆ ψ)(1 − ˆ µA)+ˆ ψˆ µIfI(θ)+ˆ ψ(1 − ˆ µI)
23The analysis of the extended bargaining problem is in the Appendix. The
implied wage is
w(θ)=1
2[ˆ π(θ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µA, ˆ µA) − rˆ Vf + rˆ V A
q ]
for θ ≥ ˆ θ
∗





A, ˆ ψ,ˆ µA, ˆ µA) − rˆ Vf = rˆ V A
q
For values of θ below ˆ θ
∗
A t h e r ei sn om a t c h . A si sp o i n t e do u ti nt h eA p -
pendix, it is possible for qualiﬁed minorities to accept jobs when θ<ˆ θ
∗
A. In
the simulations that follow we always check that they would prefer not to
m a t c hi nt h a ts i t u a t i o n .
Let ˆ π∗ ≡ ˆ π(ˆ θ
∗
A, ˆ ψ,ˆ µA, ˆ µA). Recognizing that vacancy creation leads to
ˆ Vf =0implies that in equilibrium
w(θ)=1
2[ˆ π +ˆ π∗]
So that a steady-state color-blind equilibrium is a tuple {ˆ θ
∗









(ˆ π − ˆ π∗)dFA (12)
ˆ µJ
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∗
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for J = A,I.
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1 − ˆ µA
1 − ˆ µI
¶
notice that although inference is made with respect to the whole population,
ultimately it is the matches with the majority workers that determines the
threshold test score for a match to form.16
Given the complexity of these conditions no general proof of existence has
been found. In the numerical examples below, existence of equilibrium has
been established for a wide range of parameter values. No case of multiple
equilibrium has been found. Analysis of this model is deferred until the
simulations.
16There is also an equation which controls the formation of vacancies. As we saw above,
exogeneity of α means that the magnitude v does not aﬀect the equilibrium variables of
interest.
24r Discount rate 0.04
α Meeting rate 0.2
η Proportion of productive workers 0.8
φ Proportion of minority workers 0.2
nA Distribution function index (majority) 2
nI Distribution function index (minority) 1.5
Table 1: Parameters for ﬁrst example
4 Simulations and Discussion
4.1 Example 1
For the numerical analysis, the distribution of test scores among qualiﬁed






θn+1 for θ ∈ [0,1]
1 for θ>0
This generates a class of functions parameterized by n>0. As for any n>0,
the density evaluated at a test score of zero, f(0;n)=0 , every test in this
class is viable (see (9)). Also for any two values, n1 >n 2 means that test
n1 is a more accurate than test n2 (i.e. the MLP condition is satisﬁed).
The parameters for the ﬁr s te x a m p l ea r ep r o v i d e di nT a b l e1 . 17 The
appropriateness of the parameter values will be discussed in more detail
with the presentation of the results from the Leading Example. For now, to
add concreteness, it may be helpful to think about the time unit as one year
(α has been chosen purposefully low). Also the chosen distribution function
parameters mean that the expected test score of a qualiﬁed majority worker
is 75% while the expected test score of a qualiﬁed minority worker is 71.4%.
(As the test score for unqualiﬁed workers from both groups is uniformly
distributed, their expected result is 50%.)
17In the interest of space, the sensitivity analysis will not be reported here. The
Matlab
TM code is available from the author (it requires Matlab 6.1 or higher and the
optimization toolbox).
25- µ θ∗ Vu Vq ψ ¯ w
Majority ET/DT 0.7162 0.4139 12.432 14.115 - 0.6823
Minority DT 0.7428 0.3200 12.929 14.161 0.1921 0.6832
Minority ET 0.7249 0.4139 12.432 13.920 0.2050 0.6790
Majority CB 0.7200 0.3973 12.549 14.176 - 0.6841
Minority CB 0.7280 0.3973 12.549 13.990 0.2047 0.6808
No test 0.8000 - 14.286 14.286 0.2000 0.6857
Best test, n =0 .2 0.7998 0.0017 14.243 14.304 0.2000 0.6861
Table 2: Table Caption
Table 2 summarizes the results.18 The deﬁnitions of the column headings
are consistent with their use in the preceding analysis. Each row represents
the outcomes for the speciﬁed group under the speciﬁed scenario. Given
the particular test accuracies, there is no interaction between the outcomes
for diﬀerent ethnic groups in the laissez faire economies. Consequently, the
rows marked ‘Majority ET/DT’, ‘Minority DT’, ‘No test’ and ‘Best test’
simply represent the outcomes from the implied testing regime in the basic
model.
T h eb e s tt e s ti st h ev a l u eo fn that achieves the highest value of µVq +
(1 − µ)Vu. This occurs for n =0 .2. Under this test, qualiﬁed workers are
expected to score 54.5%. For n larger than 0.3, utilitarian welfare is lower
using the test than without it. For n larger than 0.6, even qualiﬁed workers
would be better oﬀ without the test. The results demonstrate that when
testing is more selective than this, further increases in accuracy make both
the qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers worse oﬀ.19 Viewed as the same test
a p p l i e dw i t hv a r y i n ge ﬃcacy to diﬀerent ethnic groups, the minority group is
typically be better oﬀ than the majority group. The result does not depend
18While multiple steady-states have not been ruled out, plotting the SS and EM curves
over the whole feasible region reveals a distinct unique crossing point. In this way, only
unique equilibria have been observed even for extreme parameter values.
19While this has not been proven in general, π(θ
∗,µ) decreases monotonically with
accuracy for n>0.3. This pattern is robust to a wide range of parameter values. That is
for each arrangement studied, π(θ








20 - - -
40 - 0.6063 0.5686
60 0.6481 0.6684 0.6535
80 0.6968 0.7021 0.6989
100 0.7240 0.7224 0.7248
Table 3: Equilibrium Wage Proﬁles
on the size of the minority group. Instead the intuition follows straight from
that of the basic model. When presented with workers from each group, the
ﬁrms realize that the person for whom the test is more accurate is less likely
to be qualiﬁed. This also leads to more unemployment among the majority
group as evidenced by ψ<0.2.
Imposing equal treatment leaves the outcome for the majority workers
unaﬀected. The outcome for the unqualiﬁed minority workers is exactly
the same as for their majority group counterparts. The minority qualiﬁed
workers however are left much worse oﬀ for two reasons. Firstly, they are less
likely to get hired, 1−FI(θ∗
A) < 1−FA(θ∗
A). This means that unemployment
is also higher among the minority group. Second, while they get paid the
same wage at each test score, their expected test score contingent on being
hired is lower.
Minorities fair better under color-blind testing than under equal treat-
ment. This is because the eﬃcient matching threshold and the wage proﬁle
take account of their impact on the set of workers any ﬁrm meets. Still they
are bound to do worse than their majority group counterparts (and experi-
ence higher levels of unemployment) for exactly the same reasons as before.
What is notable about the results is that the majority group members do
better under color-blind testing than they do in the laissez faire economy.
This is because being lumped in with the minority group raises the ﬁrms’
prior on the probability that a majority group worker is qualiﬁed.
Table 3 summarizes the implied wage proﬁles. As V I
q >VA
q we know that
27on average the minorities get paid higher wages under diﬀerent treatment.
However, the wage proﬁles reveal that some majority group workers can re-
ceive more than any minority worker. This does not happen with color-blind
testing as every one faces the same wage proﬁle. As with equal-treatment,
under color-blind testing, minorities get lower average wages because the
cultural bias means that their test score distribution is skewed more to the
left.
4.2 Opportunity cost of vacancies
So far the theory has followed the approach typical to the literature in
assuming that vacancies have no establishment cost. Free-entry drives the
ex ante expected value of a vacancy to zero. The ex post proﬁto fﬁrms is
therefore just suﬃcient to cover the ﬂow advertising cost. The major beneﬁt
of this approach is that vacancies have zero opportunity cost which typically
simpliﬁes the bargaining solution.
While the addition of opportunity costs has no qualitative impact, it is
quantitatively important.20 To see this, consider what happens if ﬁrms have
to pay a one-time set-up cost, k, for each vacancy they create in addition to
the ﬂow advertising cost a. Unrestricted vacancy creation will now drive the
value of vacancies down to k.That is Vf = k. Analysis of the bargaining game






Eﬃcient matching means that for positive k, fewer matches will form but
the decision to match is still mutual. The matched pair simply have to cover
the set-up cost and then divide up any remaining surplus. The quantitative
importance comes from the implied value of capital share of income. With
20It seems reasonable to think that testing is more likely to be socially beneﬁcial when
there is an opportunity cost to hiring. Indeed, matching does become more selective.
In steady state, however, a proportion 1 − η of those who do get jobs are inevitably
unproductive.
28r Discount rate 0.04
α Meeting rate 60
η Proportion of productive workers 0.8
φ Proportion of minority workers 0.2
nA Distribution function index (majority) 2
nI Distribution function index (minority) 1.5
k Vacancy creation cost 7
Table 4: Parameters for Leading Example
Vf =0ﬁrms get a very small share of output in markets with realistic
meeting rates for workers.
For the purpose of the leading example, I have incorporated a set-up
cost. As became clear earlier, only the Steady-State and Eﬃcient Matching
conditions are important for deriving the variables of interest. Only the
Eﬃcient Matching conditions are aﬀected by the set-up cost. In particular
equation (11) becomes
2r[πJ(θ∗





J,µ J))dF(θ) for J = A,I
and equation (12) becomes





(ˆ π − ˆ π∗)dFA
4.3 Leading Example
The parameters, based on a time unit of one year, are reported in Table 4.
The discount rate is standard. The choice of η and φ are arbitrary but seem
reasonable. The results do not depend much on them. Given r, η and φ,
the choices of nA,n I,kand α were made to ﬁt with the following outcomes:
13 weeks average duration of unemployment, workers share of income of
2/3, acceptance rate of workers by ﬁrms of 1/11 (as reported by Autor
and Scarborough [2004]). The most signiﬁcant change from Example 1 is
that the meeting rate, α, is 300 times higher. The new rate corresponds to
29- µ θ∗ Vu Vq ψ ¯ w
Majority ET/DT 0.5807 0.9624 12.696 12.843 - 0.5169
Minority DT 0.6239 0.9526 12.745 12.851 0.1811 0.5170
Minority ET 0.6221 0.9624 12.696 12.828 0.2172 0.5168
Majority CB 0.5809 0.9614 12.703 12.846 - 0.5169
Minority CB 0.6223 0.9614 12.703 12.832 0.2171 0.5169
No test21 0.8000 - 12.983 12.983 0.2000 0.5197
Table 5: Results for Leading Example
workers making 5 applications per month. This makes matching much more
selective. (The introduction of the opportunity cost of vacancies mainly
aﬀects the wage.)
The results for the leading example are reported in Table 5. Qualita-
tively, the results are similar to those of Example 1. However, some of
the features highlighted there are less prominent and some are more so.
Under color-blind testing and equal treatment the unemployment rate for
minorities is 13% higher than for the majority group workers. Under equal-
treatment it is 11% lower.22 A feature of Example 1 that almost disappears
is wage dispersion. As matching is very selective, there is very little vari-
ation in the expected productivities of those hired. As such, there is very
little variation in the wages they receive.23
4.4 Alternative model formulations
Making the meeting rate, α, exogenous was a deliberate simplifying assump-
tion. In terms of the basic model, with a more usual constant-returns to
scale matching function (al aPissarides [2000]) changes in the test accuracy
will aﬀect the meeting rate through the eﬀect on vacancy creation. We know
22These diﬀerences become more pronounced as the size of the minority approaches
50%.
23This does not mean that I might as well have made the wage exogenous (or even
imposed the same endogenous wages on both groups). While the equilibrium appears to
exhibit the law-of-one-price, the test thresholds and therefore the aggregate outcomes are
very sensitive to the realized wage proﬁles.
30that for any α, ﬁrms will adopt more accurate tests over less accurate tests.
When the original test is such that increased accuracy leads to a lower match
surplus with constant α, ﬁrms would create less vacancies and α would fall.
Endogenizing α would not reverse the welfare implications of testing.24
When the model is used to compare predicted outcomes under cultural
bias in the test, random matching implies that α should be the same for each
group. Still, when we look at a diﬀerent hiring policies, one should expect
α to adjust. However, the focus of the paper is on the diﬀerent outcomes
faced by the ethnic groups within any regime. Also, with realistic elasticities
of meeting with respect to vacancies, changing the hiring policy would not
alter α much.
Perhaps the strongest simplifying assumption is that workers cannot
credibly reveal how long they have been unemployed. If durations of unem-
ployment were observable, workers would have types indexed by their cur-
rent spell-length. The prior probability that any worker is qualiﬁed would
then be a function of spell-length. As qualiﬁed workers would have typically
shorter durations of unemployment, the results described above would cer-
tainly be diluted. However, for a given meeting rate, α, at least under the
class of densities used for the simulations, we know that increased accuracy
slows down matching. For suﬃciently accurate tests (which ﬁrms would
readily adopt) further increases in test accuracy would make everyone worse
oﬀ.
Other informational assumptions are potentially interesting. For in-
stance, the test score could be private information to the ﬁrm. In this
case, however, wage formation would be diﬃcult to model. We know from
the work on the Coase conjecture that (see Ausubel and Deneckere [1989])
stationary bargaining equilibria lead to the ﬁrm getting all the surplus. That
would be equivalent to posting wages. In the absence of any match-speciﬁc
shock to the workers preferences (as in Masters [1999]) the Diamond [1971]
paradox would apply and the wage would be driven to zero. Another pos-
sibility is that workers do not know their own productivities. Again the
24This is simple to show numerically. However, in the interest of space, the results are
not reported here.
31objections to this variant are technical rather than economic. The diﬃ-
culty here would be that each test the worker took would reveal something
about his true productivity. This would lead to an unmanageable degree of
heterogeneity.
A major component of the contribution of this work has been to allow
t h eh i r i n gd e c i s i o n st oi n ﬂuence the population of unemployed workers and
vice-versa. Had I chosen to use the ‘Cloning’ assumption whereby workers
are replaced by their own type, µ would have been exogenous.
A further approach would have been to have the true productivity of the
worker revealed after some period of employment (most tractably accord-
ing to a Poisson process). Combining this with an exogenous birth/death
process would generate an endogenous inﬂow rate to unemployment. In that
world, the steady-state proportion of unqualiﬁed workers in the unemploy-
ment pool would be higher than occurs in my model. Still, in steady-state,
workers have to be hired in the same proportions that they enter the unem-
ployment pool. More accurate testing would still lead to a worse prior on
an individual’s productivity as occurs here.
A large literature on discrimination (e.g. Coate and Loury [1993]) is con-
cerned with understanding discrimination as an equilibrium phenomenon.
In that approach, qualiﬁcation occurs as the consequence of an unobserved
investment. In the current model I have taken qualiﬁcation as exogenous.
A ne x t e n s i o no fm yf r a m e w o r kc o u l da llow for investment. To this end it
is of interest to note that even when more accurate tests lead to lower wel-
fare, they increase the incentive to become qualiﬁed. In the examples above,
Vq − Vu always increases with test accuracy.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides a model of the labor market in which only the workers
know their true productivity. Firms adopt any testing technology that helps
to distinguish qualiﬁed from unqualiﬁed workers. At low levels of accuracy,
testing can help to overcome the informational problems. Even more accu-
rate tests are initially beneﬁcial. However, when all ﬁrms adopt the test,
32everyone can end up worse oﬀ. Greater test accuracy leads to a dilution of
the quality of the workers in the unemployment pool which means that in
steady-state, even the qualiﬁed workers can spend longer unemployed and
have lower lifetime utility than when a less accurate test is used.
It was shown that the environment is easily extended to address the
possible impact of systematic hiring tests on inequity across racial groups.
An ethnic minority is deﬁned to be a group for whom a given test is less
accurate. For more selective (and I have argued more realistic) tests, the
outcomes depend on the wage policies imposed on the ﬁrms. When ﬁrms
are allowed to recognize a worker’s background, test thresholds used to hire
individuals will diﬀer across ethnicities. In this case, the minority group
members experience lower unemployment and higher average wages than the
majority group members. When “equity” is imposed on the hiring decision,
either through equal treatment or color-blind hiring, the cultural bias in the
test causes inequity in outcomes precisely in the direction that the wage
policies were intended to prevent.
The recommendation that emerges is that ﬁrms should be allowed to
recognize the diﬀerence between individuals and adapt their hiring accord-
ingly. Of course, in practice this is exactly what people call aﬃrmative
action. It is an apparent lowering of recruitment standards directed at mi-
nority groups. In fact it is simply a recognition that the tests may not work
t h es a m ew a yf o rp e o p l ew i t hd i ﬀering backgrounds. An alternative route
is to adapt the tests to ensure a similar degree of accuracy across ethnic
groups, my results suggest that simply recognizing diﬀerences across groups
negates this requirement.
The results are complementary with those of Autor and Scarborough
[2004] with respect to equity. Both papers suggest that fears of system-
atic discrimination against minorities arising from testing my not be well
founded.25 An individual employer, as they identify, may be better oﬀ from
adopting a more accurate test. However, the implied reduction in matching
25Recall that they conclude that the adoption of systematic hiring tests tend not to
exacerbate ethnic inequity. This is because, in the absence of a test, ﬁrms would already
use statistical discrimination.
33rates can eventually lead all workers to be worse oﬀ in terms of unemploy-
ment and welfare.
6 Appendix
6.1 Analysis of Bargaining game.
We analyze the game in two parts corresponding to the choice by nature
as to who makes the wage oﬀer (after the realization of the test score, θ
and hence the posterior probability π = π(θ,µ) that the worker is of type
q). A worker’s duration of unemployment should also be relevant here. For
instance, knowing a person to be a new entrant would imply a prior of η
rather than µ. We seek an equilibrium which is stationary with respect to
the workers’ unemployment spell length. To do this we impose stationarity
of the allocation and argue at the end that the implied equilibrium is an
equilibrium of the true game. We assume that if either party is indiﬀerent
between accepting an oﬀer and rejecting it, they accept. This assumption
is common in bargaining theory. Here, it rules out some kinds of mixed
strategy equilibria.
6.1.1 Firm makes oﬀer (screening model)
Firm action: wage oﬀer wf ∈ [0,1]
Worker action: picks probability of acceptance26, ai ∈ [0,1],i= q,u
Let Vi i = q,u,f be the disagreement value value to qualiﬁed workers,
unqualiﬁed workers and ﬁrms respectively. Then,
Firm pay-oﬀs:
(
aq(1 − wf)+( 1− aq)rVf if worker type q
−auwf +( 1− au)rVf if worker type u
Type i worker pay-oﬀs: aiwf +( 1− ai)rVi,i= q,u
Firm strategies: wf(π):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
Type i worker strategies: ai(π,w):[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1]
26Although we assume acceptance in the case of indiﬀerence, using the continuous se-
lection eases the notation.









f +( 1− a)rVi
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rVq for π ≥ r(Vf + Vq)




1 if w ≥ rVi
0 otherwise
for i = q,u
There is a continuum of equilibria; one for every ω ∈ [0,rV u) but they
are all pay-oﬀ equivalent.
6.1.2 Worker makes oﬀer (signalling model)
Type i worker action: makes wage oﬀer wi ∈ [0,1]




af(1 − wq)+( 1− af)rVf if worker type q
−afwu +( 1− af)rVf if worker type u
Type i worker pay-oﬀs: afwi +( 1− af)rVi,i= q,u
Type i worker strategies: wi(π):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
Firm strategies: af(π,w):[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1] where w is wage oﬀered
by worker
In formulating their strategies ﬁrms will up-date their beliefs as to the
productivity of the worker based on the wage the worker oﬀers.





f =a r g m a x
a∈[0,1]
{a[˜ π(1 − w) − (1 − ˜ π)w]+( 1− a)rVf}
w∗




fw +( 1− a∗
f)rVi
ª
35where ˜ π are the updated beliefs of the ﬁr mb a s e do nt h ew a g eo ﬀered by
the worker. As unqualiﬁed workers can freely emulate their qualiﬁed coun-
terparts, there can be no separating equilibria, w∗ ≡ w∗
q = w∗
u.27
As perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not restrict out-of-equilibrium be-
liefs, whenever π>r (Vf + Vq) there are a very large number of equilibria.
For instance, there is one for every w∗ ∈ [r(Vf + Vq),π] supported by the
belief of the ﬁrm that wage oﬀers other than the equilibrium wage will only
be made by unqualiﬁed workers.
The equilibrium chosen here is
w∗ =
(
π − rVf if π ≥ r(Vf + Vq)








π if w ≥ Vq
0 if w<V q
This equilibrium is Pareto dominant for the workers, and it is the only
equilibrium that is "prior consistent". That is, the beliefs do not discrimi-
nate with respect to who takes out-of-eqilibrium actions except when those
actions could never be optimal for one type. (It is also consistent with the
outcome of the complete information version of Mailath et al [2000] in which
the worker simply demands the whole surplus.)
Returning to the issue of unemployment spell length. In the screening
game, ﬁrms will have stationary strategies as long as µ, Vq and Vu are
constant. As long spell-length workers can freely emulate short spell-length
workers, equilibria of the true signalling game must also be pooling with
respect to spell length. This, with stationary oﬀers by ﬁrms imply that µ,
Vq and Vu are constant. (Non-stationary equilibria may well be possible.)
27If we allowed ﬁrms to follow a mixed strategy semi-separating equilibria are possible.
366.2 Analysis of bargaining game under color blind testing.
Here there is an additional dimension of private information; workers know
their own ethnicity.28 This generates 4 types of worker. Additional to
above notation we will use superscript J = A,I to indicate the ethnic group
respectively majority and minority.
As above, we analyze the game in two parts corresponding to the choice
by nature as to who makes the wage oﬀer (after the realization of the test
score, θ and hence the posterior probability π(θ, ˆ ψ,ˆ µA, ˆ µI) that the worker
is of type q).
6.2.1 Firm makes oﬀer (screening model)
Firm action: makes wage oﬀer wf ∈ [0,1]
Worker action: picks probability of acceptance, aJ





q(1 − wf)+( 1− aJ
q)rˆ Vf for worker type q, J = A,I
−aJ
uwf +( 1− aJ
u)rˆ Vf for worker type u, J = A,I
Type iJ worker pay-oﬀs: aJ
i wf +( 1− aJ
i )rˆ V J
i
Firm strategies: wf(π):[ 0 ,1] → [0,1]
Type iJ worker strategies: aJ
i (π,w):[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1]
A sub-game perfect equilibrium is a tuple {ˆ wf,ˆ aJ
i } i = q,u; J = A,I
such that
ˆ aJ
i =a r g m a x
a∈[0,1]
n
aˆ wf +( 1− a)rˆ V J
i
o
























i is the posterior probability that the worker is of type iJ. For
28This is intrinsically diﬀerent from duration of unemployment. In any equilibrium a
person’s ethnic group aﬀects the wage distribution he faces whether it is revealed or not.
A person’s duration of unemployment can only aﬀect the wage distribution if it is revealed.





(1 − ψ)µAfA(θ)+( 1− ψ)(1 − µA)+ψµIfI(θ)+ψ(1 − µI)















1 if w ≥ rˆ V J
i
0 otherwise
When they exist, there is a continuum of these equilibria; one for every
ω ∈ [0,rmin{ˆ V A
u , ˆ V I
u }) but they are all pay-oﬀ equivalent. Any equilibrium
of this type may fail to exist if
ˆ πI
q >r (ˆ Vf + ˆ V I
q )
b e c a u s ei tt h e nb e c o m e sw o r t h w h i l et oo ﬀer a wage below rˆ V A
q at certain
test score values on the basis that even though anyone who accepts is not
type qA, there is suﬃcient reason to believe that the applicant is of type qI.
6.2.2 Worker makes oﬀer (signalling model)
Type iJ worker action: makes wage oﬀer wJ
i ∈ [0,1]





q )+( 1− af)rVf if worker type q, J = A,I
−afwJ
u +( 1− af)rVf if worker type u, J = A,I
Type iJ worker pay-oﬀs: afwJ
i +( 1− af)rV J
i ,i= q,u, J = A,I
Type iJ worker strategies: wJ
i :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1].
Firm strategies: af :[ 0 ,1] × [0,1] → [0,1].
In formulating their strategies ﬁrms will up-date their beliefs as to the
productivity of the worker based on the wage the worker oﬀers and the
implication of that oﬀer for the worker’s ethnicity.
A Bayesian perfect equilibrium is a tuple {ˆ wJ
i ,ˆ af},i= q,u, J = A,I
such that






























i is the updated belief of the ﬁrm that the worker is of type iJ
b a s e do nt h ew a g eo ﬀered by the worker. As unqualiﬁed workers can freely
emulate their qualiﬁed counterparts, there can be no symmetric separating
equilibria in pure strategies.





q − rˆ Vf if
P
J=A,I ˆ πJ































q <r (ˆ Vf + ˆ V A
q ) and ˆ πI
q >r (ˆ Vf + ˆ V I
q )
in this case it may be worth while for a type qI workers to ask for less than
rˆ V A
q . When this happens depends on parameter values. The simulations of
this equilibrium check that this condition is not violated.
Again within the relevant parameter range there are a lot of other
Bayesian perfect equilibria. The chosen one is Pareto dominant for the
workers, and is “prior consistent”.
396.3 Slope of EM curve.
Substituting for π(θ,µ) into (6) and dividing through by f(θ∗) yields






























dF(θ) > 0 (14)
Simple inspection of (13) indicates that θ∗(0) < 1. ¤
6.4 How Changes in F aﬀect the EM curve.
This analysis makes use of the Ψ(.,.) function as deﬁned in (13). As Ψ(θ∗,µ)
is increasing in θ∗ the eﬀect of increased accuracy on θ∗ will be the negative
of its eﬀect on Ψ(θ∗,µ).
Suppose, ˆ θ>0 is any threshold value of the test score and θ is any test
score such that θ>ˆ θ. Deﬁne ∆(.) to be any small change in f such that
∆ + f is a density function, continuously diﬀerentiable and more accurate
than f in the sense of MLP. The implied restrictions on ∆ are
Z 1
0







where ˆ ∆ ≡ ∆(ˆ θ) and ˆ f = f(ˆ θ). Also MLP implies that there is a unique ˜ θ








so (using the prime to represent diﬀerentiation with respect to θ), ∆0f −
∆f0 > 0. ∆ =0therefore implies ∆0 > 0 which precludes multiple crossings.
Notationally, we use ˜ f ≡ f(˜ θ).
40We wish to obtain the eﬀect of the change ε∆ to f on Ψ(ˆ θ,µ) where ε
is any scalar such that ε>0. First, is simple to see that ε∆ + f is also a
density function and more accurate than f.




(f − ˆ f)f






(ε∆ + f − εˆ ∆ − ˆ f)(ε∆ + f)
[µ(ε∆ + f)+1− µ]
³




(f − ˆ f)f






I(ε∆ + f) − I(f)
ε
as the derivative of I(f) with respect to ∆. I0(f|∆) is how the functional
I(f) changes as f moves inﬁnitesimally toward ∆+f under the restrictions
imposed by (15).





µf2 +( 1− µ)(2f − ˆ f)
(µf +1− µ)2 ˆ f
#




(µf +1− µ) ˆ f2dθ.
(17)
The sign of I0(f|∆) is not yet obvious as ∆ is negative for θ<˜ θ.
Now suppose ∆ is chosen so that so that ˜ θ>ˆ θ. In this case ˆ ∆ is negative




µf2 +( 1− µ)(2f − ˆ f)
(µf +1− µ)2 ˆ f
#
=
2(1 − µ)(µ ˆ f +1− µ)
(µf +1− µ)3 ˆ f
> 0,
the integrand in the ﬁrst term of (17) is positive and increasing in θ for all
θ>ˆ θ. So
µf2 +( 1− µ)(2f − ˆ f)





µ ˜ f2 +( 1− µ)(2 ˜ f − ˆ f)
(µ ˜ f +1− µ)2 ˆ f
(
θ ≥ ˜ θ
ˆ θ ≤ θ ≤ ˜ θ
29An alternative aproach to the same result is the Voltara Derivative used by Ryder
and Heal (1976).




µf2 +( 1− µ)(2f − ˆ f)
(µf +1− µ)2 ˆ f
#
∆dθ >
µ ˜ f2 +( 1− µ)(2 ˜ f − ˆ f)




For ˜ θ>ˆ θ both terms in (17) are positive.
If ∆ is chosen so that so that ˜ θ ≤ ˆ θ, ˆ ∆ ≥ 0 and the second term of (17)





µf2 +( 1− µ)(2f − ˆ f)













(1 − µ)f(f − ˆ f)
(µf +1− µ)2 ˆ f2dθ > 0
Consequently, I(f) increases with the accuracy of f and so Ψ(ˆ θ,µ) is de-
creasing with accuracy of f for every ˆ θ. This means that Ψ(θ∗,µ) must also
fall with accuracy and θ∗ therefore rises at every value of µ.
6.5 How Changes in F aﬀect π∗ ≡ π(θ
∗,µ)
Maintaining the notation from the preceding analysis, we examine the im-
pact of a change in the density function of the form ε∆(θ) where ε is an
inﬁnitesimal scalar and ∆ is subject to restrictions (15). We deﬁne θ∗
ε to be
the value of θ∗ that solves (6) and therefore (13). Also deﬁne π∗
ε to be the
value of π∗ associated with the change in F while holding µ ﬁxed. Then
π∗


































The ﬁrst term in the curly brackets represents the indirect eﬀect of the
change in F on θ∗ a n dt h e no nπ(θ∗,µ). The second term represents the
direct eﬀect of f on π(.,.). Simple substitution from (17) and (14) into
42(18) implies that under eﬃcient matching with ﬁxed µ, increased accuracy
increases π(θ∗,µ).
The other assertion is that movements along the EM curve towards the
South-West which occur as the market converges to steady state, reduce













































f [µf +1− 2µ]
[µf +( 1− µ)]
2dF
¾




f [µf +1− 2µ]






(f − 1)dθ > 0
the last inequality comes from the fact that π(θ,µ) is increasing in θ and
that 1 − F(θ∗) > 1 − θ∗.
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